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The commodification of citizenship through the development of «investment citizenship» (IC) programs, 
i.e. the programs that offer the acquisition of domestic citizenship through financial contribution only, needs 
to be addressed, so the article argues, through stronger democracy-oriented interpretations of international 
nationality law (INL). Unlike other arguments against IC advanced in political theory, this article argues
from within the legal practice itself. In contrast to other legal critiques of IC, however, it does not focus on 
domestic or European Union law, but on international law: it develops a new interpretation of INL that ex-
cludes granting nationality on monetary grounds only. In short, the article argues that contemporary INL is 
best interpreted in the light of the international principle of democracy (IPD), and the customary interna-
tional law principle of individual equality, as a form of international pre-commitment to democratic citizen-
ship. What this means is that the factual conditions for the justification of democracy need to be protected 
not only under the IPD, but also under INL. In turn, this implies that the conditions of naturalization en-
compass the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes, both positively so as to include those who share such 
stakes and negatively so as not to include those who do not.
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I. Introduction
The commodification of democracy (even only potentially1) induced by selling State2 
citizenship3 to individuals4, and especially by the development of domestic programs 
of «investment citizenship»5 (IC), has long been criticized from a normative per-
spective, and rightly so. 
Unlike other normative arguments previously advanced against IC in political 
theory,6 and more general critiques of the commodification of public goods and indi-
1 See Dimitry Kochenov, «Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price», in: A. 
Shachar & R. Bauböck (eds.), Should Citizenship be for Sale?, Florence 2014, 27–29. 
2 I am only considering State citizenship in this article, and not EU citizenship (see Samantha Bes-
son & André Utzinger, «Future Challenges of European Citizenship: Facing a Wide-open Pan-
dora’s Box», 13 European Law Journal (2007), 573–590) or other potential forms of transnational or 
supranational citizenship that cannot be equated with State citizenship. As will become clear in the 
course of the argument about what makes a group of people a political community, there are egalitarian 
and hence democratic difficulties in conceiving of (democratic) citizenship entirely outside of territorial 
entities like States: see Thomas Christiano, «A Democratic Theory of Territory and Some Puzzles 
about Global Democracy», 37 Journal of Social Philosophy (2006), 81–107, at 100–5; Samantha 
Besson, «Why and What (State) Jurisdiction: Legal Plurality, Individual Equality and Territorial Le-
gitimacy», in: J. Klabbers & G. Palombella (eds.), Interlegality, Cambridge 2019, 91–132. See also Peter 
J. Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», 105 American Journal of International Law 
(2011), 694–746, at 739.
3 I am only focusing on the acquisition of citizenship in this article, and not on the access to the national 
territory and immigration policies in general. While both may be related (e.g. Richard Plender, 
«Nationality Law and Immigration Law», in: R. Plender (ed.), Issues in International Migration Law, 
The Hague 2015, 1–12; Gonçalo Matias, Citizenship as Human Right: The Fundamental Right to 
a Specific Citizenship, London 2016, 153 et sqq.) and although both discussions are often conflated in the 
literature (e.g. Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, «On Citizenship, States and Markets», 22 Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy (2014), 231–257; Ayelet Shachar, «Selecting By Merit: The Brave New 
World of Stratified Mobility», in: S. Fine & L. Ypi (eds.), Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of 
Movement and Membership, Oxford 2016), the monetization of citizenship, and hence of political rights, 
raises normative issues that are distinct from those that arise from the granting of mere residence or work 
permits on monetary grounds. See also Peter J. Spiro, «The End of Olympic Nationality», in: F. Jen-
kins, M. Nolan & K Rubenstein (eds.), Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World, Cambridge 2014, 
at 491–2. Importantly, I am not looking at IC programs that would not grant full citizenship rights either 
(e.g. limited citizenship without political rights).
4 I am only considering the citizenship of individuals or natural persons in this article, and not of legal 
persons or other entities.
5 For a detailed descriptive survey of those programs, see Kristin Surak, «Global Citizenship 2.0 – The 
Growth of Citizenship by Investment Programs», 3 Investment Migration Working Paper, 20 August 
2018, <https://investmentmigration.org/download/global-citizenship-2-0-growth-citizenship-invest-
ment-programs/>, accessed on 9 June 2019. I am excluding other related programs of naturalization and 
acquisition of citizenship such as «olympic citizenship» that, like IC, do not require a connection, but, 
unlike IC, are based on talent or merit, i.e. another kind of capital (see Shachar, «Selecting By Merit», 
supra, n. 3; Shachar & Hirschl, supra, n. 3; Peter J. Spiro, «Cash-for-passports and the end of 
citizenship», in: A. Shachar & R. Bauböck (eds.), supra, n. 1, at 9–10). 
6 See e.g. Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Cambridge 
(MA)/London 2009, 54–61; Ayelet Shachar, «Dangerous Liaisons: Money and Citizenship», in: 
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vidual rights,7 the present article argues from within the legal practice itself: it pro-
poses its normative critique as the best interpretation of citizenship or nationality8 
law. In contrast to other existing legal critiques of IC, however, it does not focus on 
domestic or European Union (EU) law,9 but on international law: it develops a new 
interpretation of international nationality law (INL) that prohibits granting nation-
ality on monetary grounds only.10 
Such an interpretation may at first sound surprising given the very few limits 
traditionally set by (customary) INL on States’ sovereignty when devising the bases 
for the acquisition of nationality.11 Since the 19th Century, indeed, INL has devel-
A. Shachar & R. Bauböck (eds.), supra, n. 1, at 3–8; Rainer Bauböck, «What Is Wrong With Selling 
Citizenship? It Corrupts Democracy!», in: A. Shachar & R. Bauböck (eds.), supra, n.  1, at 19–21; 
Shachar & Hirschl, supra, n. 3, at 248–50; Ana Tanasoca, «Citizenship for Sale: Neomedieval, 
not Just Neoliberal?», 57 European Journal of Sociology (2016), 169–195; Shachar, «Selecting by 
Merit», supra, n. 3; Ayelet Shachar, «Citizenship for Sale?», in: A. Shachar et al. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Citizenship, Oxford 2017, 789–816. Contra: Javier Hidalgo, «Selling Citizenship: 
A Defence», 33 Journal of Applied Philosophy (2016), 223–239; Shaheen Borna & James M. 
Stearns, «The Ethics and Efficacy of Selling National Citizenship», 37 Journal of Business Ethics 
(2002), 193–207.
7 See e.g. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, New-York 2012, 
61–5.
8 Because this article focuses on international law and not on domestic law, it does not distinguish between 
nationality and citizenship. See also Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 
695–6; Ayelet Shachar, «Earned Citizenship: Property lessons for Immigration Reform», 23 Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities (2013), 110–158, at 129; Matias, supra, n. 3, at 41 et sqq. Accordingly, 
I will assume, as it is the case in contemporary international law, that all nationals are also to be citizens 
(and hence holders of all citizenship rights, including political rights; see e.g. Art. 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). It is important to emphasize, however, that there is clearly no 
historical and no conceptual identity between nationality and citizenship qua political membership (see 
e.g. Besson & Utzinger, supra, n. 2). It is the progressive expansion of the political franchise in the 
course of the history of the democratic State that led to a practical overlap between nationality and citi-
zenship, one that is actually protected under IHRL through the political rights to participation and 
representation of all nationals. Of course, domestic authorities benefit from a broad margin of apprecia-
tion under international law and may extend citizens’ (political) rights to non-nationals, based for in-
stance on residence or integration or any other criteria of connection to other citizens (see e.g. Rainer 
Bauböck, «Expansive Citizenship: Voting Beyond Territory and Membership», 38 Political Science 
and Politics (2005), 683–687). In those cases, the personal scope of citizenship may become greater than 
that of nationality. The reverse expansion of the scope of nationals without corresponding political rights 
is not allowed under IHRL, however. I will revert to this central question of the relationship between 
nationality and citizenship in section IV.
9 See A. Shachar & R. Bauböck (eds.), supra, n. 1. See also Jelena Džankić, The Pros and Cons of ius 
pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in Comparative Perspective, Florence 2012. 
10 The present article does not address IC programs that are hybrid and rely on some additional criteria of 
connection to other citizens such as residence or integration (see Surak, supra, n. 5, at 11 et sqq.). By 
doing so, indeed, those programs confirm this article’s point.
11 See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921 (Advisory 
Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Rep Series B No 4, p. 24. See e.g. Ian Brownlie, «The Relations of Nationality 
in Public International Law», 39 British Yearbook of International Law (1963), 284–364; Oliver 
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oped as the regime of international law that frames the conditions for the acquisition 
of State nationality, but only very minimally and in order to secure the mutual oppos-
ability of domestically defined and attributed nationality. This has been the case in 
particular to address the problems the diversity of domestic nationality law regimes 
raises in the contexts of statelessness, dual nationality or diplomatic protection. 
Gradually, however, and since the mid-twentieth century, a few additional require-
ments constraining domestic law on the acquisition of nationality have been made by 
INL treaties, including the prohibition of discrimination and of non-consensual nat-
uralization.12 Nowadays, as a result, INL prevents domestic nationality law not only 
from over-reaching, as it has been the case since the 19th Century, but also from un-
der-reaching and excluding certain people from the domestic political community.13 
To that extent, one may consider that contemporary INL does no longer only 
protect other States’ (and their peoples’) interests, but also those of the concerned 
State itself and of its people. What I would like to argue in this article is that, in doing 
so, INL actually guarantees certain minima about what holds people together in a 
State and, in turn, makes States’ existence not only justifiable in the first place, but 
also sustainable in the long run. On this contemporary reading, INL entrenches min-
imal criteria for the personal component of States’ internal structure, i.e. what con-
stitutes its people, albeit from the outside. Those minimal international law stand-
ards may be resorted to in order to support the State in case of erosion of those 
features, be it under internal or external pressure such as increased labour mobility 
and global migration. This constitutional role of INL accounts for the legal duality of 
nationality that, just like that of the State and its other constitutive elements such as 
territorial jurisdiction, is constituted and regulated under both domestic and inter-
national law at the same time, on the one hand, and with respect to the domestic as 
much as the international normative implications of that status, on the other.14 
Usually, accounts of the thickening of the requirements of INL such as this one 
are made by reference to international human rights law (IHRL). It is under the lat-
ter’s influence that INL has developed some of the new requirements bearing on do-
mestic nationality laws in the last thirty years or so, mostly to prohibit discrimination 
in the acquisition of nationality on suspect grounds such as gender, religion, disabil-
Dörr, «Nationality», Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2006, <https://opil.ou 
plaw.com/home/mpil>; Kay Hailbronner, «Nationality in Public International Law and European 
Law», in: R. Bauböck et al. (eds.), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 Euro-
pean States, Amsterdam 2006, vol. 1; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law, 
8th ed., Oxford 2012, 509 et sqq.
12 See e.g. Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 697–716; Gerard-René de 
Groot & Olivier Willem Vonk, International Standards on Nationality: Texts, Cases and Mate-
rials, Oisterwijk 2016.
13 See also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, supra, n. 11, at 518; Hailbronner, supra, n. 11, at 35.
14 See Brownlie, supra, n. 11, at 364; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, supra, n. 11, at 510–11, 518, 
and 526.
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ity or race.15. I am leaving IHRL outside the scope of the article, however, and for two 
reasons. The first one is to avoid inflationary and circular arguments about whether 
there is, and should be, an international human right to domestic citizenship16 or, 
more broadly, to democracy17. The second, and most important reason, is that the 
proposed argument does not only focus on individual interests, but also pertains to 
the protection of the conditions of public equality in the State and hence of the lat-
ter’s political and especially democratic legitimacy. Indeed, IHRL constraints on the 
domestic regulation of the acquisition of nationality have rightly been criticized for 
contributing to the erosion of citizenship as an exclusive collective status that may not 
be reduced to a set of individual rights.18 The time has come, therefore, to comple-
ment and hence counterbalance individualizing IHRL-based interpretations of INL 
with more collective democratic ones.
Such a democratic interpretation of INL could be based, I shall argue, on another 
principle of international law that emerged around 1945 together with, and as a com-
panion19 to IHRL: the international principle of democracy (IPD)20. Like IHRL,21 
the IPD protects the public or political dimension of the basic principle of individual 
equality, itself an international law principle under existing customary international 
law.22 Whereas IHRL protects individual equality as a public status (qua equal indi-
vidual rights that constitute it), the IPD protects it as a public process (qua equal and 
inclusive decision-making process in circumstances of reasonable disagreement). 
What the IPD also guarantees, I will argue, are the basic conditions for individual 
public or political equality, and hence for the justification of democracy. Those basic 
conditions amount, as I will explain, to the sharing of equal and interdependent 
15 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, supra, n. 11, at 715–7.
16 For evidence pointing against an international human right to nationality or citizenship, see e.g. Kuric 
and others v. Slovenia, App no 26828/06 (ECtHR, 13 July 2010) para 353; Case of the girls Yean and 
Bosico v. Dominican Republic (IACtHR, 8 September 2005) para 137. Contra: Matias, supra, n. 3, at 
197 et sqq.
17 For an argument against such a human right to democracy, see Samantha Besson, «The Human 
Right to Democracy in International Law: Coming to Moral Terms with an Equivocal Legal Practice», 
in: M. Susi, K. Odendahl & A. von Arnauld (eds.), New Human Rights, Cambridge 2020 (forthcoming).
18 See also Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 696 and 720.
19 See Samantha Besson, «Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context: Decoupling and 
 Recoupling», 4 Ethics and Global Politics (2011), 19–50.
20 See Christian Pippan, «Democracy as a Global Norm: Has it Finally Emerged?», in: M. Happold 
(ed.), International Law in a Multipolar World, Abingdon/New York 2012; Besson, «The Human 
Right to Democracy in International Law», supra, n. 17. See also F. Ehm & C. Walter (eds.), Interna-
tional Democracy Documents: A Compilation of Treaties and Other Instruments, Leiden 2015.
21 See Samantha Besson, «The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights», 136 Archiv für Sozial- und 
Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft (2013), 19–52.
22 See James Crawford, «Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law», 365 Recueil 
des Cours (2013), at 272 et sqq, by reference to Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Belgium v. Spain), (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 41.
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stakes.23 It is only when people’s shared interests spread over a sufficiently broad range 
of issues and in a sufficiently equal way, indeed, that their political equality matters 
and that democracy can be justified. 
This understanding of the conditions of democratic citizenship protected under 
the IPD is, the article argues, the best contemporary interpretation of INL. As the 
practice of States with respect to the acquisition of nationality confirms, various 
shorthands may be used in domestic nationality law to capture the connection be-
tween people, such as residence or descent. All of them have in common, I will pro-
pose, to ascertain (and some better than others) the existence of equal and inter-
dependent stakes between future citizens and existing ones, and hence to secure the 
conditions of public equality and democracy. A mere monetary connection of the 
kind required by IC, by contrast, does not guarantee that the concerned people share 
stakes with other members of the relevant political community that are sufficiently 
equal and interdependent for that community to remain a State and a democratically 
legitimate one in particular. If I am right, therefore, this should not only prevent IC 
from being opposable to other States, but also from being regarded as legally valid 
under INL. 
The proposed argument unfolds in three steps. In the next section, the article 
develops a democratic interpretation of INL and, more specifically, proposes an egal-
itarian interpretation of the connection requirement one can find in States’ domestic 
practice regarding the conditions for the acquisition of nationality (II.). A third sec-
tion draws some implications for the lack of validity of IC under international law 
and what may be done against commodification in future interpretations of INL 
(III.). Finally, in a fourth section, the article replies to critiques to the relevance of 
democracy in contemporary international law (IV.). 
II. A Democratic Interpretation of International Nationality Law
This section proposes a democratic interpretation of INL in the light of the IPD. Its 
argument is three-pronged. It claims, first, and from the vantage point of democratic 
theory, that the factual conditions of public equality and hence for the justification 
of democracy are the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes and that it is a re-
quirement of democratic citizenship that those conditions are preserved (A.). This is 
best done, it argues in a second step, by interpreting INL in the light of the IPD that 
is a principle of international law that protects the conditions for democratic citizen-
ship, just as INL has been interpreted in the light of IHRL in the last twenty years or 
so (B.). The upshot of the proposed argument is discussed in a third step: it consists 
23 See Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 85–7; Thomas Christiano, «Demo-
cratic Legitimacy and International Institutions», in: S. Besson & J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of 
International Law, Oxford 2010, at 130–3.
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in interpreting the «genuine connection» requirement, as it has been protected by 
INL, and the various shorthands used in domestic nationality law to capture that 
connection between members of the political community as a test for the sharing of 
equal and interdependent stakes (C.).
A. The Factual Conditions of the Justification of Democracy
It is common among democratic theorists to ground democracy in the principle of 
public or political equality, i.e. a political derivation of the principle of individual 
equality in circumstances of collective decision-making.24 In the most minimal un-
derstanding, indeed, democracy amounts to the collective decision-making process 
that includes equally all those subjected to a decision and hence best protects their 
public equality in circumstances of reasonable disagreement about that decision.
The justification of democracy in public equality, however, requires that certain 
factual conditions for public equality are fulfilled. Those conditions include, among 
others, first of all, that many important issues must arise for the whole community at 
the same time and, second, that there must be a rough equality of stakes among per-
sons in the community concerning the whole package of issues.25 
The first condition has been referred to by Christiano as the «interdependence of 
stakes», while the second has been coined the «equality of stakes». Individual stakes 
refer to the susceptibility of a person’s interests to be advanced or not by the collective 
organization of a group.26 The interdependence of those stakes matters for public 
equality to arise as a concern and, in turn, for public equality to justify democracy 
because of the inherent relationships between democracy and majority rule. For ma-
jority rule to be justified on an egalitarian basis, indeed, it is important that there be 
many issues decided over so that all can take turn in being either in the majority or 
the minority and that people can trade votes between issues depending on how im-
portant they are to them (e.g. education v. security). For democratic purposes, how-
ever, the interdependence of stakes also needs to be complemented by their equality. 
Equal say over certain issues can only be justified if all participants have stakes in 
those issues that are equal. Of course, that equality of stakes does not need to pertain 
to every issue –and it is most likely that it cannot due to the distinctness of individual 
interests and circumstances. It should, however, at least exist in the overall package of 
interdependent issues to be decided over collectively.27 The equality and interdepend-
ence of stakes have also been coined as the sharing of a «common world».28 
24 See Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 121–2; Christiano, «A Democratic 
Theory», supra, n. 2, at 87–9. See also Besson, «The Egalitarian Dimension», supra, n. 21.
25 See Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 130.
26 Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 131.
27 Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 130–1.
28 See Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 85–7.
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Importantly, first of all, sharing equal and interdependent stakes with others need 
not be conflated with sharing a culture or identity. It is compatible with multicul-
tural, multinational or multiethnic political communities. It is often precisely be-
cause people differ in their culture or other identity aspects that their sharing equal 
and interdependent stakes enables them to constitute a political community and to 
overcome cultural, nationalist or ethnic conflicts.29 An obvious example in this re-
spect is the Swiss political community. 
True, some of the stakes shared equally and interdependently by the members of 
a political community may also be shared with members of other political communi-
ties. The fact is that those transnational stakes will not usually be shared in a suffi-
ciently equal or interdependent fashion, however. For instance, one may consider that 
people in two political communities (e.g. France and Switzerland) with a shared nat-
ural border (e.g. a lake), but a different natural environment may share some stakes in 
security (e.g. around that lake), but not all of them (e.g. maritime security for France 
only). Moreover, the stakes they share may not even be equal overall due to their lim-
ited scope and hence to their lack of interdependence with other stakes the members 
of each community have (e.g. energy or industry). When the shared stakes across two 
or more political communities are interdependent and equal, however, one may con-
sider the possibility of enlarging the political community so as to encompass those 
new members, without necessarily diluting the smaller ones into a larger one, as 
would be the case in a federal State or in the European Union. As a matter of fact, 
considering the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes with others as a factual 
condition of public equality, and hence of democracy, does not exclude the possibility 
of doing so in more than one political community at a time. Some people live or have 
lived in more than one community, or are closely related to another community in 
other ways, whether those political communities are neighbours or not.
Nor, secondly, should the considering of sharing equal and interdependent stakes 
as a condition of political equality and democracy be conflated with the «all-af-
fected» principle in democratic theory. That principle requires that all those affected 
be included in the democratic process, and hence within the citizenry. Sharing equal 
and interdependent stakes goes further, however, than mere affectedness.30 It covers 
a broader range of interests over a longer period of time and is necessarily collective.
As a matter of fact, a question frequently raised in the context of discussions of 
the democratic legitimacy of international law is whether all people in the world do 
not already share stakes that are sufficiently interdependent and equal for the factual 
conditions of global democracy to be given and for a global democratic people to be 
constituted.31 Even if it is not (yet) the case for all our interests as such, certain global 
29 Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 86–7 and 98.
30 See Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 97–8.
31 See Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 132–4. 
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stakes (e.g. clean water or cybersecurity) may already be said to be shared in a suffi-
ciently interdependent fashion, albeit not necessarily in an equal way (especially be-
cause they are still so few that equality over the whole package of issues is more diffi-
cult to establish), while others (e.g. education or social security) can only be considered 
such among people living within more limited territorial boundaries such as those of 
States. Importantly, however, the existence of such transnational or global stakes and 
the fact that they may be considered as interdependent and equal does not make it the 
case that more localized stakes or stakes that are not shared in an interdependent and 
equal fashion are irrelevant from a democratic theory perspective and that domestic 
democratic communities cannot co-exist with regional or even global ones. Nor can 
we conclude from the former that anyone in the world sharing some stakes with us 
should be allowed to be part of our democratic community when we make decisions 
pertaining to other stakes we do not share equally and interdependently with them, 
but decisions that affect them all the same. Indeed, the set of stakes that are the fac-
tual conditions for domestic public equality, and hence for domestic democracy in 
this case, is unique to us. Treating them as equal members of our democratic commu-
nity when they have a lesser stake would treat all the others who share a higher stake 
unequally. Democratic membership qua right to participate in a collective deci-
sion-making process founded in the fundamental relational status of equality simply 
cannot be reduced to a loose and variable constellation of individual memberships 
depending on how each individual’s interests are affected at any given time. There are 
other epistemic correctives currently explored to make sure other people’s interests 
that are affected (albeit not interdependently and equally) are duly considered in our 
democratic deliberations even if those people are not members of the democratic 
community and, to that extent, cannot participate or be represented therein.32
Of course, finally, because sharing equal and interdependent stakes is a factual 
condition for the justification of democracy, democracy cannot be invoked to assess 
the origins of that fact and, in particular, the egalitarian and democratic credentials 
of the common world people share. This matters because, in the course of human 
history, those origins (e.g. our living together in a specific territory) have most of the 
time been arbitrary and, to some extent, non-democratic.33 This limitation weighing 
on the scope of democratic arguments should not come as a surprise, however. It is 
sometimes referred to as the «boundary-paradox» in democratic theory due to the 
inherent limitations this creates for any democratic argument.34 Providing such a 
normative assessment of the origins of democratic citizenship is not the point of the 
32 See e.g. the debate between Joachim Blatter, Rainer Bauböck and others, <http://globalcit.eu/
let-me-vote-in-your-country-and-ill-let-you-vote-in-mine-a-proposal-for-transnational-democracy/>, ac-
cessed on 9 June 2019.
33 See Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n. 23, at 87 and 98.
34 See Frederick G. Whelan, «Democratic theory and the boundary problem», in: J. R. Pennock & 
J.  W. Chapman (eds.), Liberal Democracy, New York 1983.  See also Rainer Bauböck, «Political 
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proposed argument, however. Rather, what matters in this article, and provided 
 sharing equal and interdependent stakes can be said to be a factual condition of the 
justification of democracy, is that that factual condition is preserved against future 
erosion. And that argument can readily be made from a democratic point of view.
If this first prong of the argument is correct, democratic States are required under 
the principle of democracy to protect the conditions for democracy to remain justi-
fied.35 This implies making sure the acquisition of democratic citizenship is done not 
only so as not to exclude those who share equal and interdependent stakes (and not 
to under-reach – by excluding long-term residents, for instance), on the one hand, but 
also to only include those who do (and not to over-reach either – by including people 
who have no connection whatsoever to existing members of the political community, 
for instance), on the other. 
B. Reading International Nationality Law in the Light  
of the International Principle of Democracy
It is through the international law principle of democracy, the IPD, that States argu-
ably protect democracy together and from the outside of their respective democratic 
polities. So-doing, the IPD entrenches domestic democracy by constraining domestic 
law in case democracy is under threat. Together with IHRL, it amounts to a form of 
constitutional pre-commitment on the part of democratic States that have resorted 
to international law to protect their democratic regimes against themselves.36
Like its post-1945 companion IHRL, the IPD protects the public or political di-
mension of the basic principle of individual equality, itself an international law prin-
ciple under existing customary international law.37 The IPD itself has only been cod-
ified a few times.38 For the rest, it may be considered a general principle of international 
law.39 It is, for instance, regularly referred to as a complementary principle of interna-
Membership and Democratic Boundaries», in: A. Shachar et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citi-
zenship, Oxford 2017, 60–82, at 61–4.
35 See also Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 98; Besson, «The Human Right to 
Democracy in International Law», supra, n. 17.
36 See Andrew Moravcsik, «The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post-
war Europe», 54 International Organization (2000), 217–252.
37 See Crawford, «Chance, Order, Change», supra, n. 22, at 272 et sqq., by reference to Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 41.
38 See e.g. F. Ehm & C. Walter (eds.), supra, n. 20.
39 See Pippan, supra, n. 20. The most critical authors of the contemporary protection of democracy by in-
ternational law recognize the existence of the IPD qua general principle of international law: e.g. Jean 
d’Aspremont, «The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance in International Law: A Reply to Susan 
Marks», 22 European Journal of International Law (2011), 549–570, at 553–554 and 564; Amichai 
Magen, «The Democratic Entitlement in an Era of Democratic Recession», 4 Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2015), 368–387.
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tional law in IHRL. Besides mentioning the IPD in their preambles (e.g. the Pream-
ble to the European Convention on Human Rights), IHRL treaties protect it by 
guaranteeing political rights to equal participation and representation (e.g. Art. 25 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]). IHRL courts 
and bodies have also recognized a general positive duty for States to adopt a demo-
cratic regime and hence to resort to democratic procedures when specifying and re-
stricting their human rights’ duties.40 
Of course, that international democratic pre-commitment through the IPD can 
only last as long as the most entrenched norms of international law can. Importantly, 
however, international law norms have the ability to last longer than domestic ones. 
They are indeed more difficult to amend, whether they are customary or treaty-based, 
due to the generality (of State practice or consent) requirement. Its international law 
dimension is what makes the current legal regime of democracy, and especially of 
democratic citizenship, different from what prevailed in previous ages, and especially 
in the Athenian or Roman context. It is actually what will slow down the erosion of 
that regime by comparison to what occurred previously in human history, and espe-
cially at the end of the Roman Republic.41 Relapses into what some have described as 
neo-Medieval conceptions of citizenship42, for instance, have been made structurally 
and legally more difficult by international law. I will revert to the critique of the rele-
vance of democracy in contemporary international law in light of the alleged demo-
cratic «deconsolidation» or «backsliding» in the fourth section.
To the extent that the IPD protects democracy, it also implicitly requires that the 
factual conditions for the justification of democracy, and hence for public equality, be 
secured. When the IPD protects the conditions for the justification of democracy, 
more specifically, it constrains the conditions for the acquisition of domestic citizen-
ship by making sure they include the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes. This 
is where the IPD overlaps with INL. 
True, INL has been a regime of international law for much longer than the IPD. 
Like IHRL, the IPD emerged in 1945, but even more clearly so since the 1990s.43 It 
is clear, as a result, that the minimal framing by international law of the conditions 
for the acquisition of domestic nationality since the 19th Century were not originally 
related to a concern for public equality and democracy. Nor were they actually par-
40 See Besson, «The Human Right to Democracy in International Law», supra, n.  17, by reference to 
Zdanoka v. Latvia, App no 58278/00 (ECtHR, 16 March2006), para 98; Navalnyy v. Russia, App 
29580/12 (ECtHR, 15 November2018), paras 174–5.
41 For an interesting discussion of the erosion of public equality in the past and the return of individuals to 
a solitary status see Giambattista Vico, The New Science (from the 1744 third edition, Cornell 
University Press 1948), at paras 1101–2 and 1106.
42 See e.g. Surak, supra, n. 5, at 34; Tanasoca, supra, n. 6
43 For a chronological survey of the practice of the IPD in 20th Century’s international law, see Besson, 
«The Human Right to Democracy in International Law», supra, n. 17.
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ticularly concerned with individual rights, more generally.44 With the development 
of IHRL, however, INL has gradually come to be interpreted so as to protect human 
rights, including against discrimination in the acquisition of nationality.45 Curiously, 
however, the corresponding interpretation in the light of the IPD has not occurred 
yet. The time has come to fill this gap. After all, as I explained before, IHRL and the 
IPD protect two complementary facets of political equality: human rights and de-
mocracy. Focusing only on the human rights side of political equality when interpret-
ing INL, therefore, may be detrimental to the protection of political equality and 
democratic citizenship in the long run. As a matter of fact, human rights-based inter-
pretations of INL have progressively eroded the exclusive character of citizenship: 
they expanded its personal scope so as to decrease the gap between citizens and 
human rights-holders in each State.46 
It is urgent therefore to counterbalance the influence of IHRL in INL by drawing 
more on the IPD and to provide a more balanced approach to public equality in a 
democracy. Both principles of systemic or integrative and evolutive interpretation of 
INL, as required by international treaty law (Art. 31(3)(c) and (b) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties), confirm that one may take the IPD into account in 
this context. 
C. From Genuine Connection to Sharing Equal  
and Interdependent Stakes
Since the 19th Century, INL has worked as the regime of international law that 
frames the minimal conditions for the acquisition of State nationality, but only min-
imally so and in order to secure the mutual opposability of domestically defined and 
attributed nationality. This has been the case in particular of the requirement per-
taining to the conditions for the acquisition of domestic nationality identified from 
States’ practice by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case, i.e. 
the «genuine connection» test.47
Interpreting INL in the light of the IPD implies interpreting its minimal framing 
of the domestic conditions for the acquisition of nationality by reference to the con-
ditions identified in the previous sections for the justification of democratic citizen-
ship, i.e. the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes. As a matter of fact, the «gen-
uine connection» requirement is best interpreted in contemporary circumstances as 
a test for the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes. Not only does the proposed 
democratic interpretation fit that test really well, but it provides a justification for it 
44 See Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 697 et sqq.
45 Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 703 et sqq.
46 Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 696 and 720.
47 See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4, p. 23.
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that is in line not only with the IPD, but also with IHRL whose concern for equality 
it shares.48 
In short, the Nottebohm test of «genuine connection» requires that nationality 
reflects and is based on a social fact of attachment that makes nationality «real and 
effective».49 As the practice of States regarding the acquisition of nationality has con-
firmed since then, various shorthands50 may be used to capture that genuine connec-
tion between people, whether at birth or at a later stage of naturalization: it may be 
birthplace [and the corresponding jus soli], descent [and the corresponding jus san-
guinis], marriage, legitimation, adoption, permanent residence [and the correspond-
ing jus domicilii], or other forms of integration.51 Most of them assess the connection 
between people by reference to territory,52 albeit not necessarily so. All of them, how-
ever, may be interpreted as ways to ascertain the existence of equal and interdepend-
ent stakes between future citizens and existing ones, and hence to secure the condi-
tions of public equality and democracy. Accordingly, that genuine connection 
required by INL works as much positively as a ground for inclusion (protecting 
against nationality under-reach, and reflecting IHRL requirements) as negatively as 
48 For an analogous conception of Nottebohm as «inverse conceptual guide for the future of international 
law of citizenship», see Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 723. See also 
Shachar, The Birthright Lottery, supra, n. 6, at 27–33; Shachar, «Earned Citizenship», supra, n. 8, 
at 128 et sqq.
49 Nottebohm, supra, n. 47, p. 23–4: «[…] nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attach-
ment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal 
rights and duties. […] The Court must ascertain […] whether the factual connection […] appears to be 
sufficiently close […] that it is possible to regard the nationality conferred as real and effective, as the exact 
juridical expression of a social fact of a connection which existed previously […]. […] Naturalization is not 
a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not something that happens frequently in the life 
of a human being. It involves […] his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far reaching 
consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it.»
50 Importantly, those are only shorthands (and there may actually be others) for the «connection» between 
people (and, by extension, between people and their State), and they should not be conflated with the 
connection itself. To that extent, it is wrong to refer to a jus nexi as such (e.g. Shachar, The Birthright 
Lottery, supra, n. 6, at 27–33; Shachar, «Earned Citizenship», supra, n. 8, at 128 et sqq.): all short-
hands pertain to a connection between people, and none epitomizes that connection more than others. 
51 The link between those shorthands in domestic nationality law and the «genuine connection» require-
ment is confirmed, albeit indirectly, by Peter J. Spiro, «Nottebohm and ‹Genuine Link›: Anatomy of 
a Jurisprudential Illusion», Investment Migration Working Paper, 23  January 2019, <https://invest 
mentmigration.org/download/nottebohm-genuine-link-anatomy-jurisprudential-illusion- imc-rp- 2019-1/>, 
accessed on 9 June 2019, at 19–20. 
52 See on the importance of the territorial dimension of the connection between members of a political 
community for the justification of democracy: Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 
100–5; Christiano, «Democratic Legitimacy», supra, n.  23.  See also Besson, «Why and What 
(State) Jurisdiction», supra, n.  2; Neil Walker, «The Place of Territory in Citizenship», in: A. 
Shachar et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, Oxford 2017, 553–575.
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a ground for exclusion (protecting against nationality over-reach, and reflecting the 
IPD requirements).53 
Of course, the Nottebohm test has been very controversial ever since the ICJ’s 
judgment was issued.54 While some have rejected it outright, others have rightly 
 limited its material scope to issues of dual nationality and/or diplomatic protection.55 
Yet others have re-interpreted it as amounting, at the most, to an «abuse of rights» 
test in that context.56 Finally, some have distinguished the «effectivity» of the con-
nection required in the diplomatic-protection context from its «appropriateness», 
and suggested that only the latter may be generalized.57 There is no evidence in the 
Nottebohm case, however, for the latter distinction. Moreover, such a distinction 
would be just as indeterminate as what makes for the factual connection itself.58 It 
would not be very helpful, as a result.
Scope precludes entering further into the future-of-Nottebohm controversy here. 
It is true, of course, that the context of the Nottebohm case was very specific –besides 
being a clear case of IC at the same time. To that extent, one may consider that the 
«abuse of rights» reading of the case and its applicability to dual nationality and/or 
diplomatic protection context is convincing. For the purposes of the present argu-
ment, however, it suffices to observe how resilient the «genuine connection» test per 
se has been, both in the domestic and in the international practice of States with re-
spect to the identification of the shorthands for the connection between citizens and 
hence to the criteria used for the acquisition of nationality in domestic law. To that 
extent at least, it should remain a relevant part of contemporary discussions of INL.59 
Moreover, reading the «genuine connection» test in the light of the proposed 
democratic argument about the conditions of the justification of democracy makes it 
53 See Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 718.
54 See on the ICJ’s reasoning, e.g. Brownlie, supra, n. 11, at 349–64; Hailbronner, supra, n. 11, at 60; 
Dörr, supra, n. 11, paras. 18 et sqq.; Oliver Dörr, «Nottebohm Case», Max Planck Encyclopaedia 
of Public International Law 2007. For a descriptive and normative critique of the «genuine connection» 
requirement in INL, see Josef L. Kunz, «The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase)», 54 American 
Journal of International Law (1960), 536–571; Robert D. Sloane, «Breaking the Genuine Link: the 
Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality», 50 Harvard International Law Journal 
(2009), 1–60, at 37-9; Audrey Macklin, «Is It Time to Retire Nottebohm?», 111 American Journal 
of International Law Unbound (2018), 492–497; Spiro, «Nottebohm and ‹Genuine Link›», supra, 
n. 51.
55 See Sloane, supra, n. 54, at 3–4, 12, 18–19, and 29. See also Anne Peters, «Passportization: Risks 
for International Law and Stability. Part II», EJIL Talk!, 10 May 2019, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/pass 
portisation-risks-for-international-law-and-stability-part-two/>, accessed on 9 June 2019.
56 See e.g. International Law Commission, «Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries», 
UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), General Assembly Official Records 22, Arts 4 and 32–3.
57 See Anne Peters, «Extraterritorial Naturalizations: Between the Human Right to Nationality, State 
Sovereignty and Fair Principles of Jurisdiction», 53 Germany Yearbook of International Law (2010), 
623–725, at 686–7.
58 See Brownlie, supra, n. 11, at 356 et sqq.
59 See also Peters, supra, n. 55.
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fit the post-war constitutional regime of the democratic State as it is entrenched in 
IHRL and in the IPD. To that extent, the proposed interpretation may help address-
ing the concerns usually raised against the test’s alleged old-fashioned or «romantic» 
flavour by more inclusive and «progressive» understandings of citizenship acquisi-
tion in contemporary global circumstances of mobility.60 As a matter of fact, and by 
reference to what I argued before, reinforcing the IPD interpretations in INL could 
contribute to counterbalancing some of the individualizing influence of IHRL in 
INL,61 and help thereby reinvigorating the democratic dimension of the protection 
of individual equality in international law.
III. The International Illegality of Investment Citizenship
If the proposed argument for a democratic interpretation of INL is correct, a mere 
monetary connection of the kind required by IC does not guarantee that the con-
cerned people share stakes with other members of the relevant political community 
that are sufficiently equal and interdependent for that community to remain a State 
and a democratically legitimate one in particular. It is clear indeed that, absent an 
additional reference to the other usual criteria or shorthands for the existence of a 
connection between people such as sharing residence over the same territory or a 
common history, money in itself cannot secure that the candidates for IC share inter-
dependent and equal stakes with the other citizens in that State. 
Of course, being able to contribute financially to the life of the State may be re-
garded as a way of connecting future investment citizens’ interests to those of other 
members of the population (including in a way that may, in the long run, contribute 
to democratic life itself). To that extent, they definitely share a stake in the economic 
future of the political community. However, that connection between future invest-
ment citizens and existing ones does not make their stakes sufficiently interdepend-
ent or, at least, enough of their stakes interdependent. Nor, certainly, does it make 
those stakes equal. Wealth, at least in the circumstances that give rise to the granting 
of IC, is unequally distributed. To that extent, even if there are stakes that future 
investment citizens share with existing ones and that may be considered interdepend-
ent, they cannot be equal. 
These facts about the lack of interdependent and equal stakes of investment citi-
zens actually echo what distinguishes the «common world» of political communi-
ties from more partial associations such as economic enterprises or commercial ven-
tures.62 The interests participants in those economic endeavours share with others are 
not only limited by comparison to those at stake in a political community like the 
60 See Spiro, «Nottebohm and ‹Genuine Link›», supra, n. 51, at 17 et sqq.
61 See Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 696 and 720.
62 See Christiano, «A Democratic Theory», supra, n. 2, at 86.
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State (i.e. restricted to the financial investment), but also extremely diverse within 
that limited range of interdependence (i.e. by reference to the amount of the invest-
ment in each case). 
Some authors have objected that wealth is not more «arbitrary» than birthplace, 
descent or even residence as a criterion for the acquisition of nationality and hence as 
shorthand for the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes.63 
While this is correct, this objection does not cut any ice. Generally speaking, in-
deed, citizenship is always exclusive and hence non-egalitarian in a certain respect. 
Moreover, one cannot simply argue for an arbitrary criterion for the acquisition of 
nationality by relying on the alleged arbitrariness of others. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the problem with IC in this argument is not the arbitrariness of wealth itself 
as a criterion, but its inability to track the sharing of equal and interdependent stakes 
and hence the connection between a future citizen and others. Being born or residing 
in the same place, or having ancestors who did or a spouse who does, makes it likely 
in most cases that people do share those stakes in a way that enables them to claim 
public equality and in turn democratic citizenship. Of course, those other criteria 
may not always be effective, and may even be abused. For instance, one may consider 
that descent, unless it is qualified by an additional minimal residence requirement, 
may no longer be able to track a connection to other people in a given political com-
munity in situations where there has been massive emigration without return to the 
homeland over a few generations. This may actually explain why some States whose 
nationality is acquired on grounds of descent have started limiting the political rights 
of their nationals abroad and have accordingly devised different tiers among types of 
nationality. The fact is, however, that, most of the time, shorthands like residence or 
marriage can be used to track a genuine connection between people and one that is 
characterized by their sharing equal and interdependent stakes. By contrast, it is dif-
ficult to see how wealth or financial investment could ever do so. In other words, it is 
not only a matter of imperfection or abuse of a generally performant criterion.
Additionally, some critiques of IC consider that resorting to wealth as a basis for 
the acquisition of nationality, whereas the criteria usually resorted to are criteria of 
connection, is actually in breach of the principle of equal treatment between citizens 
of the same political community. It treats future investment citizens better than 
other poorer future citizens who have to comply with residence or other integration 
requirements to be naturalized.64 The problem is that this form of unequal treatment 
does not fall under the principle of non-discrimination in IHRL for lack of use of a 
prohibited ground, unless, of course, wealth is used as a neutral ground for covert or 
63 See e.g. Kochenov, supra, n. 1, at 27.
64 See e.g. Shachar, «Selecting By Merit», supra, n. 3, at 186–9; Shachar & Hirschl, supra, n. 3, at 
250; Bauböck, «What is wrong», supra, n. 6, at 21; Shachar, «Earned Citizenship», supra, n. 8, at 
132–7.
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indirect discrimination on another prohibited ground such as race or origin.65 Bar-
ring this, the egalitarian argument may be made on grounds of the moral principle of 
public equality itself. Indeed, what is at stake is the protection of the factual condi-
tions for that principle even to apply. As I explained before, equality may be invoked 
from within the democratic community itself in order to preserve the egalitarian 
conditions of democracy.
As a matter of fact, making sure their population shares equal and interdependent 
stakes is also a condition for States to be able to represent their people democratically 
in international law-making. It is a condition, for instance, for their international 
treaties to bind them (and their people) legitimately to other States (and their peo-
ple).66 To that extent, the democratic stakes of securing the conditions of political 
equality and hence of protecting democratic legitimacy domestically through a con-
nection-sensitive acquisition of citizenship are not only domestic, but global. It is not 
just a matter of protecting domestic democracy against itself, but also of securing the 
democratic legitimacy of international law that still ensues, under current interna-
tional law-making, through the consent of (democratic) States.67
If the proposed argument is correct, IC should not be regarded as legally valid 
under INL.68 This is true in international law, but also with each domestic national-
ity regime depending on the status and rank of international law in that domestic 
legal order. 
The question then becomes not only one of international non-opposability to 
other States (and their people), but also potentially of international responsibility of 
the concerned State itself for breach of international law. Duties to cease the violation 
and prevent repetition are owed to all States in the international community of States 
and may also be claimed by all of them to the extent that duties arising under INL are 
owed to all other States and protects their collective interests, and not only the inter-
ests of the concerned State’s people. The issue turns, in other words, into a matter of 
enforcement of international law.69 This raises all sorts of procedural difficulties in 
the absence of a centralized international law-enforcer and the variations in locus 
65 See also Hidalgo, supra, n. 6, at 234–6.
66 See Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, «The Legitimate Actors of International Law-Making: 
Towards a Democratic Theory of International Representation», 9 Jurisprudence (2018), 504–540.
67 See Thomas Christiano, «Climate Change and State Consent», in: J. Moss (ed.), Climate Change 
and Justice, Cambridge 2015, 17–38; Thomas Christiano, «Replies to David Álvarez, David 
Lefkowitz, and Michael Blake», 4 Law, Ethics and Philosophy (2016), 221–236; Samantha Besson, 
«State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making: Dissolving the Paradox», 29 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2016), 289–316.
68 See also, albeit indirectly, Mixed Claims Commission (United States and Germany) constituted under the 
Agreement of August 10th 1922, Reports of International Arbitration Awards, vol. 7, 1–391.
69 See e.g. Peters, supra, n. 57, at 709 et sqq.
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standi before international courts depending on the States at stake and the people 
concerned, but also on the regime of international law whose violation is claimed.70
IV. Replies to Critiques of the Relevance of Democracy in 
 Contemporary International Law
There are at least three critiques that have been, or could be, articulated against the 
proposed democratic reading of INL and of its requirement of a connection-based 
acquisition of nationality. All three rely on the lack of or, at least, decrease in rele-
vance of democracy and democratic citizenship in international law.
First of all, the lack of relationship between domestic citizenship and interna-
tional law. According to this critique, the nationality-related rights investment citi-
zens are interested in, and actually use the most in practice, are rights acquired under 
international law rather than domestic law. Those are rights invoked towards other 
States than the State of citizenship and other individuals than their fellow citizens in 
that State.71 They arise, for instance, by virtue of that State’s regional institutional 
integration (e.g. free movement rights in the EU) or other international treaties (e.g. 
tax or investment treaties). To that extent, the domestic legal rights arising from na-
tionality, and for instance political rights, i.e. the rights most affected by the sharing 
of equal and interdependent stakes, are rarely used by investment citizens, thereby 
making the absence of effective connection between investment citizens and other 
citizens in the political community less of a concern.
This critique fails to convince, however. Given the duality of nationality under 
domestic and international law,72 indeed, INL requirements affect the normative 
consequences of citizenship both on the domestic and international planes and with-
out distinction between the citizenship rights arising from domestic or international 
law. To that extent, the fact that most of their newly acquired citizenship rights, such 
as free movement rights, investment or taxation privileges, are exercized abroad in 
practice, and are not used (mainly) to affect domestic politics, does not detract from 
the proposed argument. Empirical evidence for this may be identified in practice, as 
there have been signs of backlash and resistance on the part of other States objecting 
to the «legitimacy» of IC.73
At this stage, someone may reply that certain IC programs actually separate po-
litical rights from other rights deriving from nationality and submit the former to 
70 See e.g. Seline Trevisanut, «Nationality Cases before International Courts and Tribunals», Max 
Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 2011.
71 See Surak, supra, n. 5, at 34 and 38.
72 See Brownlie, supra, n. 11, at 364; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, supra, n. 11, at 510–11, 518, 
and 526.
73 See e.g. Surak, supra, n. 5, at 30; Shachar, «Citizenship for Sale?», supra, n. 6, at 811–2.
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additional requirements of residence or other forms of connection to other citizens. 
By doing so, they limit the impact of IC on democratic citizenship and place invest-
ment citizens among the group of nationals that is already excluded from democratic 
participation and representation. The latter are citizens who lack the capacities to 
hold those political rights like children or severely demented people. 
In reply to this objection, one should start by emphasizing that its gist confirms 
the argument made in this article and thereby supports the importance of connection 
for democratic citizenship. Unlike hybrid IC programs that add a connection re-
quirement (e.g. residence) to the financial contribution before even granting nation-
ality to investment citizens and which are not discussed in this article, however, the 
programs referred to in this objection may be criticized for contributing to the frag-
mentation of nationality rights and, arguably, to the gradual dilution of nationality 
into a disconnected set of individual rights. What holds nationality rights together, 
indeed, is their collective dimension qua rights of membership, hence the centrality 
of political rights among them. Severing an entire group of citizens’ political rights 
intentionally from other nationality rights threatens to separate nationality from 
 citizenship and to revert to previous eras in which the political franchise was in-
complete.74 This is precisely the disconnection that post-war INL aims at protecting 
nationals against, however, in particular through IHRL’s protection of their rights to 
equal political participation and representation (e.g. under Art.  25 ICCPR). Of 
course, States may expand the scope of citizens’ political rights to non-nationals on 
grounds of connection to other citizens like residence, but they may not deliberately 
exempt nationals from the personal scope of the very same rights. In other words, the 
personal ambit of «citizenship» qua political membership may become broader than 
«nationality»’s (e.g. by granting political rights to foreign residents), but not the 
other way around. 
True, as I mentioned in the previous section, States that rely on descent as short-
hand for connection sometimes divide their nationals among different groups, some 
of which have no political rights barring a minimal residence-duration in the coun-
try. It is difficult to see therefore why the same could not apply to investment citizens. 
What this rejoinder fails to see, however, is that, unlike nationality based on descent, 
IC does not rely on a shorthand that can ever capture the sharing of equal and inter-
dependent stakes between citizens of a political community in the first place. To that 
extent, the point of IC is not to correct the political consequences of a shorthand that 
no longer captures that connection so well anymore due to the greater mobility of 
citizens, and hence to introduce exceptions into a rule, but, on the contrary, to allow 
the naturalization of people whose criterion for naturalization can never capture any 
connection to other citizens that is sufficiently equal: IC simply turns an exception 
into a rule. 
74 On such constellations, see e.g. Surak, supra, n. 5, at 34.
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Second, the limited number of democratic States in the world. According to that 
critique, the argument proposed in this article only applies to democratic States. As 
a result, extending it to the interpretation of INL whose scope is universal and also 
applies to non-democratic States is not justified. 
This critique does not cut any ice, however. First of all, the IPD is a general prin-
ciple of international law.75 It binds all States, therefore, just as IHRL binds all States 
even though they do not necessarily effectively protect human rights in practice. No 
international lawyer would seriously consider that international human rights may 
no longer be considered as principles of international law merely because they are not 
yet respected everywhere.76 As a result, non-democratic States are bound by the IPD 
and the proposed interpretation of INL as much as democratic ones. Secondly, it is 
actually the right of other States under IHRL to require that non-democratic States 
comply with their erga omnes duties, including duties related to democracy. As a mat-
ter of fact, those other States also incur, arguably, a responsibility to assist non-dem-
ocratic States to become democratic and abide by their relevant duties under both 
IHRL and the IPD.77 
At this point, some authors may object that the IPD and, by extension, its demo-
cratic citizenship-related requirements, contradict the allegedly competing principle 
of self-determination in international law.78 A non-democratic State may, indeed, 
invoke the principle of self-determination to oppose the proposed democratic read-
ing of INL. 
One may reply, however, following Christiano, that the principle of self-determi-
nation is actually best understood as derived from the international principle of de-
mocracy itself79 – rather than the other way around. In order to protect individual 
equality in public decision-making processes, the latter should be democratic, and, 
for this to be the case, political communities should be able to determine themselves 
autonomously. Of course, just as any moral right includes the right not to be used or 
to be misused, self-determination may either not be used or be used non-democrati-
cally even though it derives from the protection of democracy itself. One of the moral 
limits to its not being used or misused, as with any human right, is the protection of 
equality itself.80 This is confirmed in the practice of IHRL in particular where abso-
75 See Pippan, supra, n. 20; Besson, «The Human Right to Democracy in International Law», supra, 
n. 17.
76 See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, «The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles», 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1988), 82–108.
77 See Samantha Besson, «The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human 
Rights: A Quiet (R)Evolution», 32 Social Philosophy & Policy (2015), 244–268.
78 See David A. Reidy, «On the Human Right to Democracy: Searching for Sense without Stilts», 
43 Journal of Social Philosophy (2012), 177–203. 
79 Thomas Christiano, «Self-Determination and the Human Right to Democracy», in: R. Cruft, 
S.M. Liao & M. Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford 2015, at 476–9.
80 See Besson, «The Human Right to Democracy in International Law», supra, n. 17.
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lute human rights or human rights’ duties, i.e. rights and duties that may not be jus-
tifiably restricted, pertain to equality and the protection against discrimination.81 
This interpretation of the international principle of self-determination actually ac-
counts well for the practice of the IPD where fascism and apartheid belong to the 
political regimes absolutely prohibited by international law, precisely because they 
threaten public equality.82 As a result, that egalitarian limit on self-determination 
accounts well for the democratic interpretation of the minimal genuine-connection 
requirement in INL as a condition for the acquisition of citizenship that may not be 
dispensed with democratically or in the name of democratic self-determination.
Finally, the growing irrelevance of democratic citizenship even within so-called 
democratic States. To the extent that the democratic principle amounts to a general 
principle of international law, the third critique of the proposed argument pertains 
to the impact of the erosion of the democratic practice of States worldwide on the 
IPD. The evidence authors usually put forward is the rise of authoritarian govern-
ments,83 but also of non-democratic forms of populism and of global individualism, 
and the corresponding disaffection of domestic, including democratic, politics.84
The critique does not bite, however. Of course, nationality may be approached as 
being both a descriptive and a normative concept at the same time, i.e. one that both 
relies on descriptive criteria and protects one or many moral values in drawing rights 
and obligations. The ICJ’s understanding of nationality in Nottebohm actually also 
entails both descriptive and normative elements.85 As a result, and to the extent that 
INL is eminently customary in its source, the generality and coherence of the practice 
of democratic citizenship on the ground, or lack thereof, matters normatively as well. 
Importantly, however, the present article’s purpose is not to either empirically reject 
or confirm the growing social significance of monetary status in a globalized world.86 
Neo-liberal conceptions of social life clearly imbue analogies between the nationality 
of physical persons and that of corporations these days. So-called «functional» and 
hence consequentialist readings of what nationality is for abound and, with them, the 
81 See Samantha Besson, «Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law: What is Subsidiary about 
Human Rights?», 61 American Journal of Jurisprudence (2016), 69-107.
82 See e.g. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976, 1015 United Nations Treaty Series 243; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Decem-
ber 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969, 660 United Nations Treaty Series 195, Art 3. See d’Aspre-
mont, «The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance», supra, n. 39, at 557.
83 See d’Aspremont, «The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance», supra, n.  39, at 554 and 564; 
Magen, «The Democratic Entitlement», supra, n. 39. See also Spiro, «A New International Law of 
Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 741–5; Spiro, «Cash-for-passports», supra, n. 5, at 10.
84 See Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 745.
85 See Nottebohm, supra, n. 47, p. 23.
86 See Kochenov, supra, n. 1. See also Spiro, «A New International Law of Citizenship», supra, n. 2, at 
697; Surak, supra, n. 5, at 34 and 39.
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further individualization of citizenship independently of any political community 
and the related utilitarian atomization of the corresponding rights and duties accord-
ing to functions.87 As a result, nothing prevents democratic citizenship from eroding 
and even disappearing for a time or even for good domestically, and, with it and in 
due course, all its related features in international law such as not only democracy, but 
also the modern State itself. After all, just like democratic citizenship, the State is a 
historical creation and its trajectory has not been linear.88
Nevertheless, the State consent or practice required to amend those international 
law norms would have to be sufficiently general. And this is clearly not yet the case 
with respect to the non-democratic or even anti-democratic practice of States world-
wide. What the article has been interested in, indeed, is what matters here and now 
and with contemporary INL still in place, and before the complete and worldwide 
erosion of the State structure occurs in practice and the corresponding international 
law norms become irrelevant, if this is ever to happen. As I argued before, indeed, 
IHRL and the IPD may be approached as forms of external constitutional pre-com-
mitment aimed precisely at protecting democracies against themselves when facing 
hard times.
One sometimes reads that arguments against IC, including arguments relying on 
the «genuine connection» requirement in INL, rely on a «romantic», «nostalgic» 
and even «illusionary» understanding of the political community and the State.89 
Law is not about what people do, however, but about what they should be doing. 
Citizenship may well be have become a commodity (like labour, money and land 
before it), and States may have progressively turned into hotels, but it does not mean 
that they should, be it from the perspective of democratic theory or from that of in-
ternational law.
V. Conclusion
Unlike previous normative critiques of IC, this article’s argument was developed not 
only from a democratic theory perspective, but also from within the practice of inter-
national law itself.
In short, its argument has been that contemporary INL is best interpreted in the 
light of the IPD, and the international principle of individual equality, as a form of 
87 See Sloane, supra, n. 54, at 34–5 and 59; Rishi Gulati, «The Relevance of Nationality in the Age of 
Google, Skype and Facebook» in: F. Jenkins, M. Nolan & K. Rubenstein (eds.), Allegiance and Identity 
in a Globalised World, Cambridge 2014, at 563–6.
88 On the changes in the meaning of citizenship as a result of «changes in the character of human society 
and the [corresponding] developments in international organization», see also Research in International 
Law (Harvard Law School), «Part I: Nationality, Text with Comment», 23 American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Special Supplement (1929), 21–79.
89 See e.g. Spiro, «Nottebohm and ‹Genuine Link›», supra, n. 51, at 17 and 21–22.
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international pre-commitment of democratic citizenship. What this requires, I ar-
gued, is that the factual conditions for the justification of democracy protected under 
the IPD, be also protected under INL. This implies that the domestic conditions for 
the acquisition of nationality encompass the sharing of equal and interdependent 
stakes, both positively so as to include those who share such stakes and negatively so 
as not to include those who do not. This explains in turn how the genuine-connection 
test in Nottebohm is best interpreted, under a reading of INL that takes not only 
IHRL, but also the IPD seriously, as a test for the sharing of equal and interdepend-
ent stakes. The consequence for IC is its lack of opposability, but also of validity under 
INL. 
The process of commodification of democratic citizenship that is currently at 
work needs to be addressed urgently. One way this can be done is through stronger 
democracy-oriented interpretations of INL. It is essential, so-doing, to counterbal-
ance the individualization of citizenship that has been caused by an overemphasis on 
human rights and on IHRL in the last twenty years. What is at stake is nothing less 
than the future of political equality domestically, but also, by extension, the demo-
cratic legitimacy of international law itself.

